



LINKS



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Strengthening links between technologies and society
for European disaster resilience

DISINFORMATION AS A PERSISTENT CHALLENGE DURING MAJOR POLICE OPERATIONS

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


IMPACTFUL MISINFORMATION DURING PAST POLICE OPERATIONS

Munich 2016

- nine people were killed in an extremist attack at a shopping mall
- massive amounts of rumours, deliberate ‘fake news’ and deepfakes spread instantly
- authorities received 71 reports from what they called ‘phantom crime scenes’
- the perpetrator was shot around 8:30pm, yet it took until 1:30 the next morning to give the “all-clear” message
- panic downtown led to at least one woman being seriously injured

Main problems: rapid spread of rumors, ‘fake news’, deepfakes, duty to investigate every crime



Find out more: links-project.eu



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IMPACTFUL MISINFORMATION DURING PAST POLICE OPERATIONS

Utøya 2011

- a far-right nationalist attacker launched two terrorist attacks, killing 78 people
- attacks lead to a 200-percent increase in Twitter activity in Norway
- yet information spread in an uncontrolled manner (barely reaching the right targets)
- victims shied away from using SM (neither posted their locations nor believed in the information posted by others)

Main problems: dynamics of the internet culture, rapid spread of rumors, trust in SM, verification of information sent by authorities

“There is no credibility. For instance, someone said that the police were on the island. Another said that now you are safe. We did not dare to trust it, and if you look at the time log you will see that we were right not to trust it. Anyone can post what they want on social media. There are no means to verify information. (Interviewee 2)”

quoted from: Frey, E. (2018). “Do You Tweet When Your Friends Are Getting Shot?” Victims’ Experience With, and Perspectives on, the Use of Social Media During a Terror Attack. *Social Media + Society*, 4(1).



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




IMPACTFUL MISINFORMATION DURING PAST POLICE OPERATIONS

Herne 2017

- a 19-year-old German stabbed his 9-year-old neighbor, shared pictures of his act via *WhatsApp* with friends, who in turn posted them on *4Chan*
- manhunt lasted 4 days
- more than 1400 hints reached the police, but there was great insecurity on how to interpret them

Main problems: lack of experience with internet culture, many copycats, perpetrator actively engaged in spreading misinformation



CURRENT NEEDS REGARDING SM(CS)

Resources that facilitate...

...the management of vast amounts of social media data &

...the verification of incoming SM information

- **Human resources** (flexible pools of skilled workers – internally and externally)
- **Tools** (collaboration infrastructure, AI-based filtering, storing, prioritizing of posts)
- **Guidelines** (clarifying workarounds, jurisdictions, legal boundaries and processes)

...the dissemination of outgoing information in a trustworthy way

- **Human resources** (multipliers, influencers)
- **Tools** (joint social media emergency account similar to 112, functionalities for none-public two-way communication with affected people)
- **Guidelines** (clarifying workarounds, jurisdictions, legal boundaries)
- **An informed public** (accessible verification tools)



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